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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

IS HATE A FORM OF COMMERCE? THE QUESTIONABLE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL “HATE CRIME”
LEGISLATION

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, the stories of two gruesome murders grabbed headlines across the
United States. In the early morning hours of June 7, three white supremacists
from Jasper, Texas, let a black man, James Byrd Jr., hitch a ride with them in
the back of their pickup truck.1 The men drove Byrd to a secluded area, where
they beat him, chained him to the bumper of their vehicle and dragged him for
three miles along an asphalt road.2 Medical examiners believed that Byrd was
still alive while the friction of the road was shredding his clothes and peeling
off his skin.3 He was finally killed when a collision with a concrete culvert
ripped his head and torso from his body.4
Four months later, on October 7, two men from Laramie, Wyoming,
kidnapped Matthew Shepard, a gay college student, beat him mercilessly, tied
him to a fence like a scarecrow and left him to die.5 Shepard was found
eighteen hours later, still clinging to life.6 He remained in a coma for five days
before he finally died.7 The father of one of the murderers admitted that his
son became enraged after Shepard made a pass at him earlier in the evening.8
These senseless acts of violence sparked politicians and civil rights
activists to call for stronger federal laws against these so-called “hate crimes.”9
1. Richard Stewart, Trio Charged in Jasper Slaying, HOUSTON CHRON., June 10, 1998, at
1.
2. Id.
3. Richard Stewart et al., Jasper Pulled into the National Spotlight, HOUSTON CHRON.,
June 11, 1998, at 25. Evidence that Byrd was still alive at the time he was chained to the truck
led prosecutors to charge the defendants with kidnapping, which made the murder a capital
offense. See id. This allowed the jury to sentence two of the defendants to death. See Bruce
Tomaso, 2nd Jasper Killer Sentenced to Death, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 24, 1999, at 1A.
4. Stewart, supra note 1.
5. Patrick O’Driscoll, Wyo. Attack Stuns Campus, State, USA TODAY, Oct. 12, 1998, at 3A.
6. Id.
7. Charisse Jones, Gay Student’s Brutal Death Stokes Hate Crime Debate, USA TODAY,
Oct. 13, 1998, at 1A.
8. Jim Hughes & David Olinger, Beating Wasn’t a Hate Crime, Suspect’s Family Says,
DENV. POST, Oct. 11, 1998, at A10.
9. See O’Driscoll, supra note 5; Sonya Ross, President Appeals to Congress to Pass Hate
Crime Legislation, THE BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Sept. 14, 2000, at 5A. The term “hate crime” is
973

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

974

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:973

One of the most outspoken advocates of a federal hate crime law has been
Senator Edward Kennedy.10 He has attempted several times to get a bill
through Congress that would make bias-motivated violence a federal offense.11
According to Kennedy and other civil rights activists, federal action is
required because existing laws are insufficient to address the widespread,
national problem of hate crimes.12 Although forty-eight states already have
hate crime laws on their books, provisions vary significantly from one state to
the next.13 Hate crime law advocates argue that a uniform federal law is
necessary to eradicate the inconsistencies among state statutes.14 Furthermore,
they contend that federal law currently does not reach far enough to protect
people like James Byrd and Matthew Shepard.15 Under existing federal law, it
is a crime to willfully injure or intimidate someone, based on that person’s
race, color, religion or national origin, and because such person is or has been
engaging in a “federally protected activity.”16 Kennedy’s proposed legislation
would expand the existing law in two ways. First, it would extend to crimes
based on gender, sexual orientation and disability.17 Second, it would not

somewhat of a misnomer since it does not refer to all crimes motivated by hatred, but only to
those crimes motivated by a particular bias toward the victim’s class. See John S. Baker, Jr.,
United States v. Morrison and Other Arguments Against Federal ‘Hate Crime’ Legislation, 80
B.U. L. REV. 1191, 1206-08 (2000). However, in keeping with custom, this Comment uses the
term “hate crimes” to mean bias-motivated crimes.
10. See, e.g., Edward M. Kennedy, Hate Crimes: The Unfinished Business of America, 44
FEB. BOSTON B. J. 6 (2000).
11. The original version of Kennedy’s legislation was called the Hate Crimes Prevention
Act. See S. 622, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 1529, 105th Cong. (1997). The bill was revised in 2000
and reintroduced as the Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act. S. 2550, 106th Cong. §§
1501-10 (2000).
12. Kennedy, supra note 10, at 6. FBI evidence suggests, however, that the proliferation of
hate crimes may not be as severe as some civil rights activists suggest. See Baker, supra note 9,
at 1201-04.
13. For a comprehensive list of state hate crime laws, see LU-IN WANG, HATE CRIMES LAW
app. B1-41 (1999). For a comparative look at state hate crime statutes, see Anti-Defamation
League, Map of State Statutes, available at http://www.adl.org/frames/front_99hatecrime.html
(last visited Feb. 2, 2001).
14. See, e.g., Murad Kalam, Hate Crime Prevention, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 593, 604 (2000).
15. See Kennedy, supra note 10, at 22; Democratic National Committee, News Release,
7/9/98
–
Hate
Crimes
Prevention
Act
of
1998,
available
at
http://www.democrats.org/archive/rel1998/re1070998.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2001).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (1994). Such “federally protected activities” under the statute
include enrolling in a public school, enjoying a state-sanctioned privilege or benefit, applying for
employment, serving on a jury, traveling in interstate commerce, and enjoying the goods and
services of businesses that serve the public, such as inns, restaurants and places of entertainment.
Id. This law was passed in 1968 in response to attacks on civil rights workers in the South. See
Kennedy, supra note 10, at 6.
17. S. 19, 107th Cong. § 107(a) (2001).
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require a prosecutor to show that the victim was engaging in a federally
protected activity.18
In 2000, Senator Kennedy’s bill came close to becoming law. In June, the
Senate approved adding Kennedy’s legislation to a defense appropriation bill.19
On September 13, in what seemed to be a stunning victory for civil rights
activists, the House also passed a bipartisan motion to add Kennedy’s
amendment to the defense bill.20 This victory, however, proved to be
temporary. Congress stripped the hate crime language from the defense bill
one month later.21 On October 30, President Clinton begrudgingly signed the
bill into law without Kennedy’s hate crime provision.22
Because of the bill’s near-passage, and in light of the fact that Democrats
picked up congressional seats in the 2000 election, it is likely that the hate
crime debate will heat up again.23 In one of President Clinton’s final speeches
in office, he urged Congress to pass hate crime legislation.24 Lawmakers
heeded Clinton’s plea. On the first day of business following President George
W. Bush’s inauguration, the defeated hate crime bill was reintroduced in the
Senate as the Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act of 2001.25
The bill’s previous failures, however, were no accident. Laws against hate
crimes have drawn intense opposition and have been criticized on many
grounds. One common argument against hate crime laws is that existing laws
against murder and assault are sufficient in dealing with hate-motivated
violence.26 When questioned about his state’s failure to pass tougher hate
crime legislation in the wake of the James Byrd murder, then Texas Governor
George W. Bush pointed out that the perpetrators in that case were caught,
tried and sentenced to death without the assistance of a special hate crime

18. See id.; Kennedy, supra note 10, at 6.
19. 146 CONG. REC. S5434 (daily ed. June 20, 2000).
20. 146 CONG. REC. H7532-41 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 2000). The vote in the House breaks
down as follows: Among Democrats, 190 voted for the motion and 17 voted against; among
Republicans, 41 voted in favor and 174 voted against. See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 471,
available at http://clerkweb.house.gov/cgi-bin/vote.exe?year=2000&rollnumber=471 (last visited
Feb. 2, 2001).
21. Anti-Hate Language Dropped From Bill, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 6,
2000, at 13A.
22. President Signs Defense Upgrade, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 31, 2000, at 3.
23. See Deb Price, Election Gives Mixed Results for Gays, THE DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 13,
2000, at 9.
24. See Philippe Debeusscher, Clinton Urges Congress to Pass Hate Crimes Bill on King
Holiday, AGENCE FR.- PRESSE, Jan. 16, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2321634.
25. S. 19, 107th Cong. (2001). Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, all references to a
federal “hate crime bill” or “hate crime legislation” refer to this proposal.
26. See, e.g., Mona Charen, Trying to Win Ugly, available at http://www.townhall.com/
columnists/monacharen/printmc20001027.shtml (Oct. 27, 2000).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

976

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:973

law.27 Hate crime laws are also criticized on the grounds that they criminalize
mere thoughts or that they give special treatment to certain classes of
citizens.28 Some conservative Christian groups are strongly opposed to giving
special protection to homosexuals and have lobbied vigorously against the
federal bill.29
Hate crime laws have also been attacked on constitutional grounds. In
1992, the Supreme Court struck down a St. Paul, Minnesota, ordinance that
criminalized certain bias-motivated speech.30 The Court found the ordinance
violated the First Amendment.31 The next year, however, the Court upheld a
Wisconsin statute that provides for enhanced sentences for criminals who
choose their victims based on race, religion, color, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin or ancestry.32 A federal law would face even more
constitutional scrutiny, though, since it would extend federal jurisdiction into
areas that have traditionally been of state concern.
With this in mind, the drafters of the federal hate crime bill have included
findings that attempt to show that Congress has authority under the
Constitution to enact such legislation.33 Specifically, the findings state that the
legislation is consistent with Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause,
which grants the power to regulate commerce among the several states.34 The
language also suggests that the bill is a proper exercise of congressional
authority under the Thirteenth Amendment, which empowers Congress to

27. The 2000 Campaign; 2nd Presidential Debate Between Gov. Bush and Vice President Al
Gore, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2000, at A22.
28. See, e.g., Charen, supra note 26; Clyde Haberman, Finding Flaws in the Logic of Bias
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 1999, at B1. In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Judy Shepard, the mother of Matthew Shepard, gave a stirring rebuttal to these two arguments.
See Combating Hate Crimes: Promoting a Responsible Role for the Federal Government:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 27-30 (1999) (statement of Judy
Shepard).
29. See, e.g., Traditional Values Coalition, Traditional Values Coalition Condemns Passage
of Senate Hate Crimes Amendment, available at http://www.traditionalvalues.org/pr062000.html
(June 20, 2000).
30. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). The ordinance at issue stated:
“Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or
graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.” Id. at 380.
31. Id. at 391 (holding that the “First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special
prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects”).
32. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). The statute at issue can be found at WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 939.645(1)(b) (West 1996).
33. S. 19, 107th Cong. § 102 (2001).
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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enact appropriate legislation to enforce the ban on slavery and involuntary
servitude.35
The courts, however, may be hesitant to embrace these arguments. On
May 15, 2000, the Supreme Court handed down a decision in United States v.
Morrison,36 which, following in the heels of the landmark case of United
States v. Lopez in 1995,37 casts serious doubts on how far Congress can go in
controlling violent crime without running afoul of the Constitution. In
Morrison, the Court struck down a provision of the Violence Against Women
Act of 1994 that gave rape victims the right to sue their attackers in federal
court.38 The Court ruled that the law was an unconstitutional extension of
Congress’s Commerce Clause power.39 The Court also held that the statute
was unconstitutional under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
gives Congress authority to protect citizens from unequal treatment by the
states.40
During the Senate debates on the hate crime legislation in June 2000,
Senator Orrin Hatch recognized that Kennedy’s bill raises “serious
constitutional questions, especially in light of [Morrison].”41 He added that the
law would likely be found unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Thirteenth Amendment.42 Senator Robert
Byrd was also concerned that the law would not withstand constitutional
scrutiny.43 He stated that relying on the Thirteenth Amendment was a
“tenuous argument,” and he also recognized the limits Morrison put on
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment authority.44 Senator John Warner followed
by addressing the Commerce Clause issue.45 He stated that the Morrison
decision places “serious boundaries” on Congress’s Commerce Clause power
and concluded that he had “serious concerns” about the constitutionality of
Kennedy’s amendment.46
This Comment addresses the concerns raised by the senators. It calls into
question the constitutionality of the pending hate crime legislation and
determines whether the bill, if passed into law, could withstand a challenge in
court. Specifically, this Comment addresses whether the bill can be justified
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
36. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
37. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
39. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619.
40. Id. at 627.
41. 146 CONG. REC. S5426 (daily ed. June 20, 2000).
42. Id. Senator Hatch also doubted that the bill could withstand a challenge under the First
Amendment. Id. That particular issue, however, is not addressed in this Comment.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 146 CONG. REC. S5427 (daily ed. June 20, 2000).
46. Id.
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under the Commerce Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment or the Thirteenth
Amendment. Although the findings in the hate crime bill do not specifically
invoke the Fourteenth Amendment, this amendment warrants discussion since
it has often been used to justify federal civil rights laws.47
Section II of this Comment briefly traces the case law concerning each of
the aforementioned constitutional provisions. Section III closely examines the
Morrison case and shows how it has changed the Court’s interpretations of
both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. Section IV
analyzes the impact the Morrison decision has had on lower courts’
understandings of the Commerce Clause. In particular, it demonstrates various
methods courts have used to distinguish Morrison. Section V introduces the
Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act of 2001 and analyzes its
constitutionality in light of Morrison and later Commerce Clause cases. This
section also demonstrates why the bill is beyond the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Furthermore, this section examines whether the bill can be
upheld under the Thirteenth Amendment. Finally, Section VI concludes that
the legislation contains severe constitutional defects and should be abandoned
as a means to combat hate crimes.
II. HISTORY
A.

The Commerce Clause

The Commerce Clause is by far the most widely used source of authority
to justify federal criminal and civil rights laws. This clause gives Congress the
power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”48 In the 1824 case of Gibbons v. Ogden,
the Supreme Court established that the Commerce Clause granted Congress
broad legislative power.49 In Chief Justice Marshall’s often-cited opinion, the
Court took an expansive view of what the term “commerce” entailed:
“Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is
intercourse.”50 The Court held that Congress’s Commerce Clause power does
not stop at the boundary lines of each state but can reach matters occurring
within a state so long as such activities have some commercial connection with
another state.51 Marshall noted, however, that Congress cannot regulate

47. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 920-21 (13th
ed. 1997).
48. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
49. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 187-90 (1824). The Court held that Congress
had authority to supercede a state law when it granted Thomas Gibbons a license to operate a
steamboat ferry between New York and New Jersey. Id. at 239-40.
50. Id. at 189.
51. Id. at 195-96.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

IS HATE A FORM OF COMMERCE?

979

activities that are purely intrastate—that do not extend to or affect other
states.52
The Gibbons decision left no bright-line definition of “interstate” or
“intrastate,” making it difficult for future courts to determine when Congress
was acting within its constitutional authority. This was not an immediate
problem, however. At the time of Gibbons, most commerce in the United
States was local. Thus, Congress had few motives for using its Commerce
Clause authority, and courts were given few opportunities to clarify Gibbons.53
This changed, however, in the late 1800s, as rapid industrialization and the
development of railroads reformed the economic structure of the United States.
Commerce became more nationalized, and Congress came under increasing
pressure to pass stronger regulations.54 New federal laws inevitably led to
legal challenges. Thus, courts were once again called on to determine when
Congress had acted within its constitutional bounds and when it had gone too
far.
The Commerce Clause jurisprudence that developed followed along two
lines. On the one hand, federal laws that sought to directly regulate interstate
activity were generally found to be consistent with Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority. The Supreme Court, relying on the Marshall Court’s
expansive definition of “commerce” as “intercourse,”55 upheld laws that
sought to regulate the channels, methods, instruments or goods of interstate
commerce.56
A famous example of this approach can be found in Houston, East & West
Texas Railway Co. v. United States (the “Shreveport Rate” case).57 In that
case, the Court upheld a federal order regulating the rates charged on a railway
line that ran between Texas and Shreveport, Louisiana.58 An important aspect
of the case was that one of the rates regulated was on an intrastate route.59 In

52. Id. at 195.
53. See Alexander Dombrowsky, Comment, Whether the Constitutionality of the Violence
Against Women Act Will Further Federal Protection From Sexual Orientation Crimes, 54 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 587, 590 (2000).
54. See id.
55. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) at 189-90.
56. Courts later recognized this as two distinct categories: regulations of the “channels” of
interstate commerce and regulations of the “instrumentalities.” See United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000).
57. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
58. Id.
59. See id. at 350. The railway company charged a higher rate to carry articles from
Shreveport into Texas than it did to carry articles across equal distances within Texas. Id. at 349.
When the government demanded that the rates be equal, the railway company argued
unsuccessfully that equalizing the rates would require raising the rates on intrastate lines within
Texas, and thus the order was an unconstitutional extension of federal authority into intrastate
commerce. Id. at 349-50.
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cases where the channels or objects of interstate commerce are regulated
directly, the Court has been willing to let congressional authority extend into
the interior of the state. As Marshall noted in Gibbons, Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority does not cease at the border of each state.60 For example, in
Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, the Court upheld Congress’s authority to
confiscate eggs shipped in violation of the Pure Food and Drug Act, after they
had already crossed state lines and were sitting in a baker’s storeroom.61
Another important development of this broad grant of authority, as
demonstrated in the Hipolite Egg case, is that the Court has allowed Congress
to regulate channels of interstate commerce even when the purpose of the
regulation is non-economic. Other examples are Champion v. Ames, in which
the Court upheld a federal law banning the sale of lottery tickets across state
lines,62 and Hoke v. United States, in which the Court upheld a federal law
prohibiting the taking of a woman across state lines for immoral purposes.63
The other arm of Congress’s Commerce Clause power is the authority to
regulate activities that are not interstate in themselves, but which have some
effect on interstate commerce. Marshall recognized this authority in Gibbons,
but left open the question of what kind of “effect” on interstate commerce
needed to be present to make federal intervention constitutional. Before the
Great Depression of the 1930s, the Court took a very narrow view of this
authority. The Court ruled that Congress could only use its Commerce Clause
power to regulate activities that had a direct effect on interstate commerce.64
During the Depression, this “direct effect” test led the Court to thwart
many of President Roosevelt’s New Deal programs.65 Frustrated by the
Court’s consistent rejection of his economic recovery acts, Roosevelt unveiled
his “Court-packing” plan, in which he threatened to nominate up to six
additional judges to the Supreme Court in order to obtain a favorable

60. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 194-96 (1824).
61. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
62. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
63. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
64. One of the most extreme examples of this restriction can be found in United States v.
E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). In that case, the Court found that Congress could not
prohibit a sugar refinery from buying out its competitors, even though the acquisition would give
that one business control over ninety-eight percent of the nation’s sugar refining. Id. The Court
concluded that the purchase would have an indirect, rather than a direct, effect on interstate
commerce, and thus was beyond the reach of Congress’s Commerce Clause power. Id. at 17.
65. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating a federal
regulation of maximum working hours and minimum wages for coal miners); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (prohibiting the President from imposing
rules of fair competition on a poultry farmer who did all of his business within one state); R.R.
Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidating a federally mandated retirement
and pension plan for railroad workers).
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majority.66 Although the Senate ultimately rejected his idea,67 the Court heard
Roosevelt’s message loud and clear and began to modify its interpretation of
the Commerce Clause.68 This led to the watershed case of NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., in which the Court abandoned the “direct effect” test in
favor of what became known as a “substantial effects” test.69 Under this new
test, Congress was given the authority to regulate all activities that have “such
a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens or
obstructions.”70
In Wickard v. Filburn, the Court took the holding of Jones & Laughlin one
step further, stating that Congress can regulate an entire class of activities
when those activities, taken in the aggregate, would have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.71 The appellee in Wickard was a farmer who violated
a federal regulation by growing excess wheat on his private farm.72 Congress
had passed a law restricting wheat production in an effort to keep wheat prices
stable.73 The farmer argued that since he used the excess wheat solely on his
own farm, his activity would have little if any effect on interstate commerce.74
The Court, however, found that the activity was within Congress’s Commerce
Clause power, for although the farmer’s activities alone might not substantially
affect interstate commerce, a wide epidemic of farmers growing excess wheat
for personal use would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce by
lowering the demand for wheat nationwide, causing wheat prices to plummet.75
The Wickard decision turned the Commerce Clause into a “catch-all”
clause that could be used to justify almost any exercise of federal authority.
When all else failed, Congress could simply say the magic words “Commerce
66. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 132-34 (1995).
67. See id. at 147-54.
68. According to conventional wisdom, the dramatic change in the Court’s position was due
to Justice Roberts’ decision to side with the pro-Roosevelt justices in order to save the Supreme
Court from the Court-packing plan. See, e.g., Michael Ariens, A Thrice Told Tale, or Felix the
Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620 (1994). This claim, however, may be more legend than fact. See
GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 47, at 185 n.10 (citing contrasting authorities supporting and
debunking the Roberts story).
69. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
70. Id. at 37.
71. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
72. Id. at 114-15. The regulation at issue was passed under a provision of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938. 7 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994).
73. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 directed the Secretary of Agriculture to
proclaim a national acreage allotment for each year’s crop of wheat, which is then apportioned to
the states and their counties, and is eventually broken up into allotments for individual farms. See
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 1335).
74. Id. at 119.
75. Id. at 127-29.
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Clause” in order to defend a federal law against a constitutional challenge.
This was most apparent in the 1964 Supreme Court cases of Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States76 and Katzenbach v. McClung.77 At issue in those
cases was Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited certain
business owners from discriminating against customers on grounds of race,
color, religion or national origin.78 The Court sidestepped the issue of whether
the law could be justified under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of
“equal protection” when applied against private business owners.79 The Court
instead held that the act was valid under the Commerce Clause. Using the
Wickard aggregation principle, the Court in Heart of Atlanta concluded that
racism at hotels, if left unregulated, would have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce by discouraging blacks from interstate travel.80 Although
there were no formal congressional findings that such an effect existed, the
Court held that as long as there was a “rational basis” to find the connection,
the law was a proper exercise of Commerce Clause power.81 The same
“rational basis” approach was used in McClung, where the Court approved
Congress’s power to prevent discrimination at a barbecue stand in Alabama.82
After Heart of Atlanta and McClung, Congress began using its broad
Commerce Clause authority to further expand the scope of federal criminal
law. A new breed of federal crimes appeared, covering areas such as gun
control,83 racketeering84 and drugs.85 As long as Congress could articulate
some rational connection between the regulated activity and interstate
commerce, the Supreme Court was unwilling to interfere. Perhaps the most

76. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
77. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1994). The statute states that “[a]ll persons shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
and accommodations of any place of public accommodation . . . without discrimination or
segregation on the grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin.” Id. § 2000a(a).
79. For a federal law to be valid under the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be directed
toward a state or a state actor. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620-27 (2000). This
“state action” requirement is discussed infra Section II.B. Justice Douglas, in his concurring
opinion, found the law to be valid under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that the
rights of citizens to travel freely should not be equated with the rights that protect cattle, fruit and
other articles of commerce shipped across state lines. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 279
(Douglas, J., concurring).
80. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 253.
81. Id. at 258. The Court concluded that the testimony of black citizens before
congressional committees formed the requisite rational basis by presenting “overwhelming
evidence that discrimination at hotels and motels impedes interstate commerce.” Id. at 253.
82. McClung, 379 U.S. at 303-04.
83. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994).
85. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-63 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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significant example of judicial deference was found in Perez v. United States.86
In this case, the Court upheld a federal law against extortionate credit
transactions, or “loan sharking.”87 The Court found that although loan
sharking may primarily take place on the local level, the practices are generally
controlled by nationally organized criminal syndicates.88 The criminal
activities of these syndicates, in turn, create a detrimental effect on interstate
commerce by siphoning away money that would otherwise be used for
legitimate commercial purposes.89 Thus, like the wheat farmer in Wickard, the
loan shark in Perez engaged in a class of activities that had a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.90 Justice Stewart, in his dissent, pointed out that this
“cost of crime” argument could be extended to bring virtually all criminal
activity under federal jurisdiction.91
The runaway train of Commerce Clause power, however, would come to a
screeching halt in the 1995 case of United States v. Lopez.92 The law at issue
in Lopez was the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal
crime to possess a gun within one thousand feet of a school.93 In striking down
the statute, the Court laid out the analytical framework it would later use in
Morrison. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing the majority opinion, divided
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority into three categories: (1) Congress can
regulate the channels of interstate commerce; (2) Congress can regulate and
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce—persons or things that
travel in interstate commerce; and (3) Congress can regulate activities that,
when taken in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.94
The Court easily found that the Gun-Free School Zones Act did not fall in
either of the first two categories.95 To be constitutional, then, the statute had to
pass the “substantial effects” test. The Court found the law did not pass this
test for at least four reasons. First, the activity Congress sought to regulate—
the possession of guns near schools—was not economic in nature.96 Second,
the statute contained no “jurisdictional element” that would have required the
86. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 892 (1994).
88. Perez, 402 U.S. at 155.
89. Id. at 156-57.
90. Id. at 154.
91. Id. at 157-58 (1971) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
92. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
93. The original version of the law made it a federal crime “to possess a firearm at a place
that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q)(1)(A) (1994).
94. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
95. Id. at 559.
96. Id. at 561. The Court stated that the statute “has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any
sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.” Id.
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prosecution to prove as an element of the crime that the defendant’s activity
had some connection with interstate commerce.97 Third, there were no formal
congressional findings indicating that possessing a gun in a school zone had a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.98 It is not particularly surprising that
Congress neglected to include formal findings, though, since the Court had
stressed in Heart of Atlanta and McClung that such findings were unnecessary
for a judicial determination of a substantial effect, so long as there was a
“rational basis” to find a connection.99 Finally, the Court determined that the
link between the possession of a gun near a school and any effect on interstate
commerce was attenuated.100 The government, as it had done in Perez,
attempted to use a “cost of crime” argument that concluded that guns near
schools affected interstate commerce by hindering national productivity.101
The Court stated that this line of reasoning would require the Court to “pile
inference upon inference in a manner that would . . . convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort
retained by the States.”102 Thus, according to the Court, the law did not give
due reverence to the principles of dual federalism on which the Constitution
was founded.103
After Lopez, it was clear that the “substantial effects” test does indeed have
its limits, and the Court left four guidelines in determining where these limits
lie. Lopez, however, did not indicate which of these four factors were the more
relevant ones.104 If Congress included extensive documentation indicating that
a “substantial effect” existed, would that be sufficient? Would it be enough if
Congress had attached a “jurisdictional element”—if it had burdened the
government to show that the defendant’s activities would substantially affect
interstate commerce? As shown below, the Court in United States v. Morrison

97. Id. at 562. After the Lopez decision, the statute was amended to include a jurisdictional
element. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1998) (requiring a showing that the firearm
“has moved in or . . . otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce”).
98. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63.
99. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964).
100. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-67.
101. See id. at 564. Justice Breyer reiterated this argument in his dissent, claiming that gun
violence in schools has an adverse effect on classroom learning, preventing students from
receiving the skills required for future jobs, and that this in turn would substantially harm
interstate commerce. Id. at 622-23.
102. Id. at 567.
103. The Court stated that maintaining a “healthy balance of power between the States and
the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.” Id. at 552
(quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
104. See Andrew St. Laurent, Reconstituting United States v. Lopez: Another Look at Federal
Criminal Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 61, 83 (1997) (stating that “[w]hich of these Lopez
factors, if any, will emerge as the determinative ones [is] yet to be established”).
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answered “no” to the former question; a challenge to the hate crime legislation
would answer the latter.
Also unclear was the viability of the Lopez decision itself. The case was a
5-4 decision, and three justices wrote particularly vigorous dissents.105 Justice
Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion, joined by Justice O’Connor,
stressing that Lopez should be regarded as a “limited holding.”106 Kennedy
expressed reluctance to reverse decades of Commerce Clause case law and was
comfortable with Lopez only because he found it did not overrule any previous
Supreme Court decision.107 Therefore, it remained to be seen whether Lopez
would represent a dramatic change in Commerce Clause jurisprudence or
simply prove to be an anomaly.108
B.

The Fourteenth Amendment and the “State Action” Doctrine

The Fourteenth Amendment historically has been a source of authority for
federal laws protecting civil rights, although it is not relied upon in the Local
Law Enforcement Enhancement Act. Ratified in 1868, the Fourteenth
Amendment was one of three constitutional amendments passed in the wake of
the Civil War. The main objective of these post-Civil War amendments was to
ensure that former black slaves were recognized as free citizens and were
endowed with all rights and privileges enjoyed by white citizens.109 The
Fourteenth Amendment mandates, among other things, that no state “deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”110 Section

105. Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer all wrote dissenting opinions. Lopez, 514 U.S. at
602-44. Justices Ginsburg, Stevens and Souter joined with Breyer’s dissent. Id. at 615.
106. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
107. Kennedy recognized that “the Court as an institution and the legal system as a whole
have an immense stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it has evolved to
this point.” Id. at 574. With respect to the Gun-Free School Zones Act, however, Kennedy
concluded that “we have not yet said the commerce power may reach so far.” Id. at 580. Justice
Thomas also wrote a concurring opinion in Lopez, although he advocated extending the
majority’s holding rather than limiting it. Id. at 584-602. Thomas called for eliminating the
“substantial effects” test altogether, finding it inconsistent with both the text of the Constitution
and with earlier case law. Id. at 601.
108. See, e.g., Parker Douglas, The Violence Against Women Act and Contemporary
Commerce Power: Principled Regulation and the Concerns of Federalism, 1999 UTAH L. REV.
703, 706 (recognizing that scholars regarded Lopez as “either a contraction of Congress’s
previously expansive regulatory power under the Commerce Clause or a limited ruling that will
have little or no impact on future commerce power debates”). See also United States v. Bishop,
66 F.3d 569, 590 (3d Cir. 1995) (arguing that after Lopez, “the winds have not shifted that
much.”); James M. McGoldrick, The Civil Rights Cases: The Relevancy of Reversing a Hundred
Plus Year Old Error, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 451, 474 (1998) (predicting that “it is doubtful that
Lopez will lead to any significant restriction on commerce power”).
109. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880).
110. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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5 of the Amendment gives Congress the power “to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of [the Amendment].”111
The right to “equal protection,” however, has never been absolute. The
Supreme Court has allowed states limited room to treat classes of citizens
differently.112 Under early equal protection jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
allowed differences in treatment if the differentiation was reasonable and fairly
related to the object of the regulation.113 The Court revamped this approach in
the 1960s under the guidance of Chief Justice Warren. While retaining the old
“reasonableness” standard for some types of discrimination, the Warren Court
imposed a “strict scrutiny” test on other forms of differentiation.114 Under this
test, a state’s discriminatory practices could only be constitutional if they were
“necessary” to achieve a legislative end (as opposed to being “fairly related” to
the end)115 and the legislation served a “compelling” state interest.116
This dual system of analysis was a target of hot debate.117 Courts
struggled to determine which types of discrimination needed only pass the
“reasonableness” (or “rational relation”) test and which were subject to the
“strict scrutiny” test. The Supreme Court ruled that regulations must pass the
“strict scrutiny” test if they impact fundamental rights or if they involve
“suspect” classifications.118 However, the terms “fundamental rights” and
“suspect classifications” were left open for interpretation.119
The Supreme Court has consistently found race to be a “suspect
classification.”120 Discrimination based on national origin is also considered
“suspect” and must pass the “strict scrutiny” test.121 The Court has also

111. Id. § 5.
112. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1995).
113. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
114. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 47, at 630.
115. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
116. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627, 634, 638 (1969).
117. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing
that the Equal Protection Clause “does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in
some cases and a different standard in other cases”).
118. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971).
119. The struggle over “fundamental rights” has been the focus of countless treatises and
articles, and it has sparked several controversial Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., San Antonio
Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that public education is not a
fundamental right under the Constitution); Graham, 403 U.S. at 375 (finding that the right to
welfare benefits is fundamental). However, since the hate crime bill, unlike existing federal antibias laws, is not limited to activities that affect federally protected rights, the equal protection
discussion here will focus only on the “suspect classification” aspect of the Supreme Court’s test.
120. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
121. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504 and n.10 (1976) (citing cases).
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included religious discrimination in this category.122 The Court, however, has
refused to include characteristics such as age, mental disability or sexual
orientation under the “suspect” category.123 Thus, state laws that discriminate
based on these latter classifications need only pass the “rational relation”
test.124 Gender originally was classified as non-suspect.125 More recent
Supreme Court decisions, however, have altered this. Although the Court has
never given gender classifications full “suspect” status, it has recognized them
as “quasi-suspect,” requiring a third intermediate level of scrutiny.126
The multi-tiered classification system has given courts some guidance
when determining whether a state or local law violates the Equal Protection
Clause. A challenging party must show that the law fails to comport to the
level of scrutiny appropriate for the particular type of discrimination at issue.
However, in situations where Congress has acted affirmatively under Section 5
of the Amendment to prevent discrimination, there is an additional hurdle that
has to be crossed: the federal law or regulation must involve a state or state
actor.127
The Supreme Court clarified this “state action” requirement in the Civil
Rights Cases of 1883.128 The cases were a consolidation of five challenges to
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited particular businesses from
122. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 885 (1985) (referring to religious
discrimination as “inherently suspect”).
123. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (explicitly refusing to
recognize age as a suspect class); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442
(1985) (holding that a lower court erred in finding mental retardation to be a “quasi-suspect”
classification, which would have triggered higher scrutiny); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 63132 (1996) (implicitly classifying sexual orientation as non-suspect by analyzing discriminatory
amendment to Colorado’s constitution using the lower “rational relation” test).
124. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 470 U.S. at 885 (holding that “[u]nless a classification
trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions . . . our
decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the
classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest”).
125. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (applying the “rational relation” standard
to gender discrimination).
126. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (concluding that gender discrimination
must serve “important” government objectives and must be “substantially related” to those
objectives). Scholars have suggested that the Court in Cleburne established a fourth level of
scrutiny for disability discrimination, one that was stricter than the “rational relation” test but not
as stringent as the intermediate standard of Craig. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 632 (1997). However, in Heller v. Doe, 509
U.S. 312, 318-19 (1993), the Supreme Court made it clear it was applying the lower “rational
relation” standard when analyzing a law that discriminated between the mentally retarded and the
mentally ill.
127. The plain language of the Amendment only prohibits states from practicing
discrimination; it says nothing about private actors. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
128. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Court stated: “Individual invasion of individual rights is not the
subject-matter of the amendment.” Id. at 11.
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denying services to customers based on race, color or previous condition of
servitude.129 The Court struck down as unconstitutional the provisions of the
Act that were not directed at state actors.130 Over the years, however, the
Court softened the “state action” requirement. It ruled that Congress’s Section
5 power could reach private actors who performed public functions.131 The
Court also held that Congress could reach activities where the involvement of
the state was merely peripheral.132
The “state action” requirement continued to lose favor in the Warren
Court. In the 1966 case of United States v. Guest, 133 six justices advocated an
outright abandonment of the “state action” interpretation laid out in the Civil
Rights Cases. Justice Brennan, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Douglas, wrote that he did not accept an interpretation of Section 5
that limited Congress’s power to the correction of ills caused by state laws or
state actions.134 Justice Clark, joined by Justices Black and Fortas, wrote:
“[T]here now can be no doubt that the specific language of [Section] 5
empowers the Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies—with or
without state action—that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights.”135
These arguments, however, were made in dicta.136 Thus, scholars were unsure
how later courts would read Guest.137 At the time of United States v.
Morrison, the status of the state action requirement was still unclear.
C. The Thirteenth Amendment
The Thirteenth Amendment bans slavery and involuntary servitude.138
Like the Fourteenth Amendment, it was passed in the wake of the Civil War in
an attempt to promote equality between black and white citizens. It is also
similar to the Fourteenth Amendment in that it empowers Congress to enforce

129. Id. at 8-9.
130. Id. at 18-19.
131. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508 (1946) (holding that exclusion of
Jehovah’s witnesses from company-owned town constituted a state action because town
functioned like a public municipality).
132. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1944) (holding that judicial
enforcement of a private covenant that excluded minorities from property constituted a state
action); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1966) (filing police report that falsely
accused blacks of committing crimes was sufficient to satisfy the state action requirement).
133. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
134. Id. at 782-83.
135. Id. at 762.
136. The majority concluded that the Court’s decision “require[d] no determination of the
threshold level that state action must attain in order to create rights under the Equal Protection
Clause.” Id. at 756.
137. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term Foreword: Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34-38 (1977).
138. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
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the Amendment’s provisions.139 The Supreme Court has interpreted this grant
of power broadly, finding that Congress can not only affirmatively enforce the
ban on slavery and involuntary servitude, but can also enact legislation to erase
“all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.”140
The scope of the “badges and incidents” language, however, has never
been clear. In the 1874 case of United States v. Cruikshank, a federal district
court ruled that the Thirteenth Amendment authorizes the federal government
to prosecute those who violate the rights and privileges of black citizens.141
The court distinguished between ordinary crimes and crimes motivated by
race.142 While the court found that ordinary crimes fall within the state’s
exclusive jurisdiction, it stated that crimes motivated by race fall within federal
authority under the Thirteenth Amendment.143 However, the Supreme Court,
when reviewing the case, declined to comment on the lower court’s Thirteenth
Amendment analysis.144 Later, in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court held that
the “badges and incidents” of slavery do not include private acts of racial
discrimination.145
This interpretation was abandoned, however, in the 1968 case of Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., where the Court concluded the Thirteenth Amendment
does empower Congress to fight private racism.146 The Court held that a
provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 allowing victims of racial
discrimination to sue private defendants147 was a valid exercise of Congress’s
Thirteenth Amendment authority.148 The Court pointed out that unlike the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment has no “state action”
requirement.149 The Thirteenth Amendment, therefore, can reach a whole class
of activities that are beyond the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. For
example, the Court has found that Congress has power under the Thirteenth
Amendment to eliminate racial barriers in the acquisition of property,150 access
to amusement parks151 and admission to private schools.152
139. Id. § 2.
140. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.
141. United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 711-12 (C.C.D. La. 1874).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 712.
144. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
145. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24-25.
146. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
147. The statute provides that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property.” 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994).
148. Jones, 392 U.S. at 413.
149. Id. at 438. The plain text of the Amendment simply declares that “[n]either slavery nor
involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
150. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 409 (1968).
151. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
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Although the Thirteenth Amendment was originally directed toward
blacks, the Court has stated that Congress can exercise its power under the
Amendment to eliminate other forms of racial discrimination.153 The Court
also implied that the Thirteenth Amendment reaches discrimination based on
ethnicity and religion.154 Scholars have even suggested that the Thirteenth
Amendment can reach gender discrimination as well,155 but the Supreme Court
has never addressed this issue.
There has been a striking paucity of cases concerning Thirteenth
Amendment doctrine. The Amendment last attracted Supreme Court scrutiny
in 1989.156 Aside from the cases cited above, Thirteenth Amendment
jurisprudence has remained virtually dormant since the nineteenth century.157
This is not surprising given the Court’s broad interpretation of the Commerce
Clause. As shown in the Heart of Atlanta and McClung cases discussed above,
federal bias laws have been easily justified under the Court’s broad
interpretation of the Commerce Clause.158 There had rarely been a need, then,
for litigants to advance a Thirteenth Amendment argument. However, in light
of the Lopez decision and its narrowing of Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority, the Thirteenth Amendment may prove to be a crucial “back-up”
argument to justify congressional actions that may no longer fit into the
Court’s new view of Commerce Clause power.
D. Summary
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Morrison, the
scope of federal authority under the Commerce Clause, the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Thirteenth Amendment was anything but clear. It was
apparent that Lopez significantly limited Congress’s broad power under the
Commerce Clause, but the extent to which this power was limited remained
unclear. The Fourteenth Amendment’s “state action” requirement seemed to
survive, but significant doubt still existed about its vitality. Congress’s
152. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
153. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1976) (finding that
allowing whites to bring suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was consistent with Congress’s
enforcement power under the Thirteenth Amendment).
154. See Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987). The Court concluded that
discrimination against Jews and Arabs was covered by § 1982, the same statute the Court had
found in Jones to be a valid exercise of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment power. Id. at 617-18.
The Court, however, did not explicitly address the Thirteenth Amendment issue.
155. See, e.g., Emily Calhoun, The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments: Constitutional
Authority for Federal Legislation Against Private Sex Discrimination, 61 MINN. L. REV. 313,
349-62 (1977).
156. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
157. See generally Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1995).
158. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
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Thirteenth Amendment authority was, and still remains, relatively unlitigated.
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Morrison did not
touch on the Thirteenth Amendment, it did make strides in clarifying both the
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s “state action”
requirement.
III. UNITED STATES V. MORRISON
A.

Violence Against Women Act

At issue in the Morrison case was the civil remedy provision of the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA).159 The VAWA was first
introduced in both the Senate and House of Representatives in 1991.160 The
bill was subjected to almost four years of hearings in the Senate Judiciary
Committee and in various House committees as well.161 These hearings
resulted in what one court described as “voluminous” findings and a
“mountain” of legislative history.162 Through this evidence, Congress
attempted to demonstrate that violence against women had become a national
epidemic with devastating effects. For example, one Senate report found that
domestic violence alone costs the nation as a whole between $5 billion and $10
billion a year on health care, criminal justice and other social costs.163 The
report also found that more than four million women are battered by their
husbands or partners each year and that three of every four American women
are victims of violent crimes at some point in their lives.164 The report also
included data suggesting that states had been lax in dealing with the problem of
violence against women.165
The congressional hearings also produced evidence that domestic violence
had a serious detrimental effect on interstate commerce. A Senate report
concluded that “[g]ender-based crimes and fear of gender-based crimes
restricts movement, reduces employment opportunities, increases health
expenditures, and reduces consumer spending, all of which affect interstate
commerce and the national economy.”166

159. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
160. See S. 15, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. 1502, 102d Cong. (1991).
161. See Dombrowsky, supra note 53, at 600-01.
162. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 964, 968 (4th
Cir. 1997). Justice Souter also adopted the “mountain” metaphor in his dissenting opinion in
Morrison. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628-29 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
163. S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 41 (1993).
164. Id. at 38.
165. Id. at 44-47.
166. Id. at 54.
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The VAWA was finally enacted on September 13, 1994, as part of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.167 The VAWA did
several things to combat the perceived epidemic of violence against women. It
provided grants to states to help police officers and prosecutors fight these
types of crimes.168 It also established a grant to create a national toll-free
domestic abuse hotline.169 More significantly, however, the Act provided for
criminal and civil penalties against perpetrators of gender-motivated violence.
The law made it a federal offense to cross state lines (or enter or leave Indian
territory) for the purpose of committing a crime of violence against women.170
The most controversial provision of the Act, however, was the civil remedy
provision.
The civil remedy provision, codified in § 13981 of Title 42, United States
Code, provided that “[a] person . . . who commits a crime of violence
motivated by gender . . . shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the
recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory
relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate.”171 The statute
defined a “crime of violence” as an act that could constitute a felony against
the victim whether or not criminal charges have been filed.172 The statute
stated that a crime was “motivated by gender” if it was committed “because of
gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based
on the victim’s gender.”173
According to the text of the statute, § 13981 drew its authority from both
the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.174 Unlike
the criminal provision, however, § 13981 did not require that the perpetrator or
victim travel across state lines or engage in any interstate or commercial
activity. Furthermore, the statute did not provide a cause of action against a

167. Pub. L. No. 103-322 §§ 40001-40703, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902-55 (1994). The O.J.
Simpson case, which brought the issue of domestic violence to the national forefront, may have
been partially responsible for the VAWA’s passage. See, e.g., Linda Hirshman, Scholars in the
Service of Politics; Those Who Would Deny Men’s Abuse of Women Twist Statistics and Skip the
Research, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1994, at M5; Stacey L. McKinley, Note, The Violence Against
Women Act After United States v. Lopez: Will Domestic Violence Jurisdiction Be Returned to the
States?, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 345, 345-46 (1996).
168. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796gg-3796gg-5 (1994).
169. Id. § 10416.
170. 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (1994).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994).
172. Id. § 13981(d)(2).
173. Id. § 13981(d)(1).
174. Id. § 13981(a). Some scholars suggested that the civil remedy provision could be
justified under the Thirteenth Amendment as well. See Violence Against Women: Victims of the
System: Hearing on S. 15 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 101-102 (1991)
(statement of Burt Neuborne, Professor, New York University School of Law). However, the
Thirteenth Amendment was not used as a basis of authority in the statute’s findings.
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state or state actor, nor did it require state action before the remedy could be
utilized.
Women’s groups immediately recognized the civil remedy provision of the
VAWA as a powerful new weapon in the war against gender-motivated
violence.175 But the Lopez decision, which came out seven months after the
VAWA was passed, cast doubt upon § 13981’s constitutionality.176 Thus, it
seemed likely that invoking the VAWA’s civil remedy provision would lead to
a constitutional challenge in the Supreme Court. Ultimately, that is what
happened, and a young woman named Christy Brzonkala would act as the test
subject.
B.

Facts of the Case

Brzonkala’s story began on September 21, 1994, one week after the
VAWA became law, while Brzonkala was a freshman at Virginia Polytechnic
Institute (Virginia Tech).177 According to Brzonkala, she was raped in her
dorm room that night by two varsity football players, Antonio Morrison and
James Crawford.178 She claimed that Morrison requested sexual intercourse
from her, but after she adamantly refused, he pinned her against her bed,
ripped her clothes off and forced her to submit to vaginal intercourse.179
Brzonkala claimed that when Morrison was finished, Crawford switched
places with him and proceeded to rape her as well.180 Brzonkala said that after
that, Morrison raped her a second time and left her with a warning: “You better
not have any fucking diseases.”181 Later, Morrison was heard in the dormitory
dining room declaring that he “like[d] to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of
them.” 182
Brzonkala slipped into a deep depression after that.183 She stopped
attending classes and even attempted suicide.184 Eventually, she sought a
temporary withdrawal from the university for the 1994-95 academic year.185
In April 1995, Brzonkala filed a complaint with the university against the two
athletes.186 At a disciplinary hearing, Morrison admitted having nonconsensual
175. See, e.g., Deborah Ellis, Crime Bill Should Make Women Feel Safer, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
20, 1994, at A22.
176. See generally McKinley, supra note 167.
177. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 953 (4th Cir. 1997).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 953.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. She did not press criminal charges due to a loss of physical evidence over the
previous seven months. Id. at 954.
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intercourse with Brzonkala.187 Crawford, however, denied having sex with
her.188 After hearing all the evidence, the university suspended Morrison for
two semesters but found insufficient evidence to punish Crawford.189
Morrison hired an attorney, who claimed that Morrison’s due process
rights were violated at the hearing and threatened to sue the university.190 The
university backed down and agreed to grant Morrison a new hearing,191 where
Brzonkala again recounted the events of September 24, 1994.192 After seven
hours, the committee re-imposed Morrison’s two-semester suspension.193
Unfortunately for Brzonkala, this was not the end of the story. The young
woman, struggling to put the whole tragedy behind her, was devastated to read
in a newspaper that the university’s senior vice president and provost had
overturned Morrison’s suspension and instead found him guilty of the lesser
offense of “using abusive language.”194 The school had not bothered to tell
Brzonkala that the man who had admitted to sexually assaulting her would
again be attending classes with her.195 Brzonkala, fearing for her life, dropped
out of Virginia Tech.196
C. Lower Courts’ Rulings
Brzonkala brought a federal suit against the university and several of its
top officials under Title IX of the Education Amendment Act,197 claiming she
was treated unfairly because of her gender and was subjected to a hostile
environment.198 She also sued Morrison and Crawford in federal court under
§ 13981 of the VAWA.199
Both of her claims were dismissed at the district court level. The court
granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion on the Title IX claim.200 On the

187. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 954.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. Morrison’s due process claim was based on an “ex post facto” allegation: he claimed
he was disciplined under a sexual assault policy that had not yet been published in the student
handbook. Id.
191. Id.
192. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 954-55.
193. Id. at 955.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 956.
196. Id. at 955.
197. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
198. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772 (W.D. Va.
1996) [hereinafter Brzonkala I].
199. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va.
1996) [hereinafter Brzonkala II].
200. Brzonkala I, 935 F. Supp. at 779. On the “disparate treatment” claim, the court ruled
that Brzonkala failed to allege facts supporting an inference of discriminatory intent on the part of
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VAWA complaint, the court conceded that Brzonkala had made a valid claim
under the statute,201 but found that § 13981 was not constitutional under either
the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.202
The court’s Commerce Clause analysis centered on a comparison between
§ 13981 and the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the statute struck down in Lopez.
The court recognized three differences between the two laws: (1) § 13981 is
civil and the Gun-Free School Zones Act is criminal; (2) § 13981 is backed by
legislative findings; and (3) § 13981 requires fewer steps of causation between
the regulated activity and commerce.203 Nonetheless, the court concluded that
these differences were “insignificant” and were overshadowed by the striking
similarities between the two laws.204 Therefore, the court held that Congress
exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause when it passed § 13981, as
it had when it passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act.205 The court also
engaged in a lengthy discussion of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence,
ultimately concluding that “some state involvement is necessary” for Congress
to invoke this power and that the “VAWA does not address the states.”206
Based on that discussion, the court concluded that enacting § 13981 was not a
legitimate exercise of federal authority under the Fourteenth Amendment.207
The court sympathized with Brzonkala’s plight, but stressed “Congress is not
invested with the authority to cure all of the ills of mankind.”208
The Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision and reinstated
Brzonkala’s § 13981 claim and her Title IX claim.209 The three-judge panel
concluded that § 13981 was a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority.210 Unlike the district court, the panel found the “mountain” of
legislative findings supporting § 13981 to be a significant factor in
the defendants. Id. at 778. As to the “hostile environment” claim, the court found that the alleged
actions of the university did not amount to an objective hostile environment, nor did Brzonkala
allege that she perceived the environment to be hostile; rather, she feared future hostility. Id.
201. Brzonkala’s pleadings met the minimum requirements under the statute because the
characteristic of the alleged rape combined with Morrison’s disparaging comments constituted a
claim of “gender animus.” Brzonkala II, 935 F. Supp. at 785.
202. Id. at 801.
203. Id. at 789.
204. In particular, the court found these similarities: both regulated local criminal activity,
both lacked a jurisdictional element and both inappropriately tipped the balance of power away
from the states. Id. at 791-92.
205. Brzonkala II, 935 F. Supp. at 793.
206. Id. at 794, 800.
207. Id. at 801.
208. Id.
209. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997)
[hereinafter Brzonkala III]. The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court with respect to
Brzonkala’s “hostile environment” claim but affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of her
“disparate treatment” claim. Id. at 961, 962.
210. Id. at 974.
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distinguishing the case from Lopez.211 Pointing out that Lopez was a “limited
holding,”212 the panel affirmed § 13981’s constitutionality and remanded the
case.213 Because the court found § 13981 constitutional under the Commerce
Clause, it did not address whether the section was valid under the Fourteenth
Amendment.214
The Fourth Circuit vacated this decision six weeks later after rehearing the
case en banc.215 The full Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision
with respect to both the Title IX216 and § 13981 claims.217 Circuit Judge
Luttig,218 in a rather colorful opinion, seemed to mock the petitioners for trying
to use “interstate commerce” power to regulate a “non-commercial intrastate”
activity.219 He found § 13981 to be beyond the scope of Congress’s
Commerce Clause power.220 Finding otherwise, he argued, would violate
fundamental principles of federalism.221 Furthermore, Luttig refused to ignore
the Fourteenth Amendment’s “state action” requirement.222 Thus, the court
upheld the district court’s ruling and dismissed the case.223 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide whether § 13981 was constitutional,224 but it
denied certiorari as to Brzonkala’s Title IX claim.225
D. Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause Analysis
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of Lopez, wrote for the majority in
Morrison. Addressing the Commerce Clause issue first, Rehnquist applied the

211. Id. at 968.
212. Id. at 969 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
213. Id. at 974.
214. Brzonkala III, 132 F.3d at 964 n.8.
215. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999)
[hereinafter Brzonkala IV].
216. Id. at 827 n.2.
217. Id. at 889.
218. Luttig dissented in the previous Fourth Circuit decision. Brzonkala III, 132 F.3d at 97478.
219. Brzonkala IV, 169 F.3d at 826.
220. Luttig wrote: “Because section 13981 neither regulates an economic activity nor includes
a jurisdictional element, it cannot be upheld on the authority of Lopez or any other Supreme Court
holding demarcating the outer limits of Congress’ power under the substantially affects test.” Id.
at 836.
221. See id. at 840-43.
222. Luttig stated that upholding the VAWA under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
would force the court to “extend the reach of Section 5 . . . beyond a point ever contemplated by
the Supreme Court since the Amendment’s ratification over a century and a quarter ago.” Id. at
827.
223. Id. at 889.
224. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
225. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1578 (2000).
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three-prong test he had established five years earlier in Lopez.226 He first
established, and petitioners had conceded, that § 13981 did not fall under either
of the first two categories: it did not seek to regulate a channel of interstate
commerce, nor did it seek to regulate an instrumentality of interstate
commerce.227 Like the Gun-Free School Zones Act, § 13981 could only be
constitutional under the Commerce Clause if it passed the “substantial effects”
test as defined in Lopez.228 The Court used the four Lopez factors to determine
whether the action sought to be regulated, gender-motivated violence, was one
that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Unlike Lopez, however,
the Morrison Court gave some indications as to which of the four factors were
more important to the analysis.
1.

The nature of the conduct regulated

The Court made it clear that this factor should be given the greatest weight.
The majority chastised the petitioners and Justice Souter’s dissent for failing to
recognize that the non-economic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue in
Lopez was “central” to the decision in that case.229 As he did in Lopez, Chief
Justice Rehnquist pointed out that every time the Court upheld a statute under
the “substantial effects” test, “the activity in question had been some sort of
economic endeavor.”230 Even though § 13981 was a civil rather than a
criminal statute, the majority had no trouble finding that gender-motivated
violence was not economic in nature.231
2.

Jurisdictional element

The Court was less clear on the importance of the jurisdictional element.
Depending on how one reads a statement in the opinion, this factor is either
critical or is barely significant. The Court stated that “a jurisdictional element
may establish that the enactment [§ 13981] is in pursuance of Congress’
regulation of interstate commerce.”232 This seems to hint that had § 13981
contained a jurisdictional element, it would have been constitutional despite its
non-economic nature. On the other hand, this phrase can be interpreted as an
implied warning that since a jurisdictional element “may” establish
constitutionality, it also may not, and thus a jurisdictional element, standing
alone, would not be sufficient to show constitutionality. In addition, the
majority stated that a jurisdictional element would merely “lend support” to the
226. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000).
227. Id. at 609.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 610.
230. Id. at 611 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-600 (1995)).
231. Rehnquist wrote: “Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the
phrase, economic activity.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
232. Id. at 612
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argument that the statute has a sufficient link to interstate commerce.233 Like
the Gun-Free School Zones Act, § 13981 also lacked a jurisdictional
element.234
3.

Congressional findings

The key distinction between the Gun-Free School Zones Act and § 13981
was the congressional findings listed in the latter along with the “mountain” of
findings that came out of almost four years’ worth of committee reports. The
majority conceded that the findings supporting the VAWA’s constitutionality
were “numerous.”235 However, the Court made it clear that “the existence of
congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality
of Commerce Clause legislation.”236 The Court restated that whether an
activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce is a “judicial rather than
a legislative question” and that the Supreme Court has the final say on the
matter.237 The Court abandoned the “rational basis” test used in Heart of
Atlanta and McClung, which limited the Court’s review of a congressional
finding of substantial effects.238 Instead, the Court made it clear that
congressional findings need to be more than just rational; they need to
convince the Court that a substantial effect indeed exists.
4.

Attenuation of the link to interstate commerce

The Court used a two-pronged analysis to determine whether the link
between gender-motivated violence and interstate commerce was attenuated.
First, the Court pointed out that the causal connection relied upon in the
congressional findings was based on the same “cost of crime” and “national
productivity” chain of inferences that the Court had found insufficient in
Lopez.239 In rejecting this approach once again, the Court made it clear that it
would not apply the aggregation principle of Wickard to regulations of noneconomic violent crimes.240
Second, the Court found the link to be attenuated because it, when taken to
its logical extremes, put no limit on Congress’s power under the Commerce

233. Id. at 613.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 614.
236. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
237. Id.
238. The phrase “rational basis” appears nowhere in the majority opinion. See id. at 601-27.
Contrast this with Lopez, where the Court at least acknowledged the precedents supporting the
“rational basis” test. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995).
239. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
240. The Court stated: “We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on
interstate commerce.” Id. at 617.
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Clause.241 Thus, it would allow Congress to inappropriately intrude upon
matters that are traditionally left to the states. Stressing that “the limitation of
congressional authority is not solely a matter of legislative grace,” the Court
emphasized that a line must be drawn between what is of national concern and
what is of local concern.242 The Court found that regulation and punishment of
intrastate violence has always been a matter for the states.243 As if that were
not enough, the Court further stated that “we can think of no better example of
the police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and
reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of
its victims.”244
Neither Justice Kennedy nor Justice O’Connor chose to write separately in
Morrison. Rather, they joined Rehnquist’s opinion, sending a clear message
that the Lopez-Morrison test is now the proper one to use when analyzing
federal laws passed under the Commerce Clause. Thus, contrary to some
predictions, the Supreme Court used its first post-Lopez Commerce Clause
case to strengthen Lopez rather than to distinguish it as a limited holding.245
Justice Thomas wrote a brief concurring opinion in Morrison, in which he
reprised an argument he made in Lopez, calling for the elimination of the
“substantial effects” test.246
E.

Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment Analysis

The Court’s analysis of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was
strikingly clear. The Court unambiguously held that it would follow the
principle set out in the Civil Rights Cases that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits only state action. Rehnquist called this a “time-honored principle”
that is “‘firmly embedded in our constitutional law.’”247 The Court stressed
that the Amendment “‘erects no shield against merely private conduct.’”248
The petitioners tried to argue that this principle had been abandoned in
Guest, where six justices agreed that Congress should be given more power to
punish private actors under Section 5. However, Rehnquist stated that this
“naked dicta” could not supplant the “enduring vitality” of the state action
requirement.249 The Court easily found, as had the en banc Fourth Circuit and

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 615-16.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616-18.
Id. at 618.
Id.
See supra note 108.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
Id. at 621 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 and n.12 (1948)).
Id. (quoting Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 13 and n.12).
Id. at 624.
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the district court, that § 13981 was not directed at a state or state actor and thus
could not be constitutional under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.250
F.

Dissenting opinions

Justices Souter and Breyer dissented in Morrison. Souter, who wrote the
longer of the two opinions, attacked the majority’s Commerce Clause analysis
on several grounds. First, he took issue with the majority’s conclusion that the
“substantial effects” question is one for the courts to answer.251 According to
Justice Souter, the majority departed from the decisions of Heart of Atlanta
and McClung, which stressed that the judiciary’s role is not to second-guess
whether a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce exists, but rather to
determine whether Congress had a “rational basis” to find such an effect.252
He pointed out that mere anecdotal evidence of a substantial effect was
sufficient to satisfy the “rational basis” test in Heart of Atlanta and
McClung.253 Yet, in Morrison, the majority determined that Congress’s
“mountain” of statistical, scientific evidence was not sufficient.254 Justice
Souter found these conclusions irreconcilable.255
Justice Souter also disagreed with the Court’s emphasis on the “nature of
the activity regulated” factor. He argued that case law made it clear that the
nature of an activity that causes a burden on interstate commerce is irrelevant
in determining whether the activity can be regulated under the Commerce
Clause.256 To Justice Souter, the majority erred by making the “substantial
effects” test dependent upon the nature of the cause.257 He also disagreed with
the majority over the importance of a statute’s infringement into traditionally
state matters. He argued that the majority’s belief that the Constitution divides
power into easily definable “state” and “federal” spheres is mistaken.258
Federalism, he argued, is better protected by procedural safeguards than by
judicially created limits on federal power.259
Like Justice Souter, Justice Breyer also criticized the majority for focusing
on causes rather than on effects.260 He further chastised the majority for
250. Id. at 626-27.
251. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 635.
254. Id. at 614.
255. Id. at 634-35 (Souter, J., dissenting).
256. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 640-45 (Souter, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 644 n.13. Justice Souter wrote: “For if substantial effects on commerce are proper
subjects of concern under the Commerce Clause, what difference should it make whether the
causes of those effects are themselves commercial?” Id.
258. Id. at 645-46.
259. Id. at 650.
260. Id. at 657 (arguing that “only the interstate commercial effects, not the local nature of the
cause, are constitutionally relevant”) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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creating an amorphous “economic or non-economic” test that he believed
would lead to confusion and inconsistencies among lower courts.261 Also,
Justice Breyer argued that it is inappropriate for the Court to continue to limit
federal authority during a time when the country is becoming increasingly
nationalized.262 Unlike Justice Souter, however, Justice Breyer also expressed
unease about the majority’s Fourteenth Amendment analysis. Although he
refrained from attacking the majority’s conclusion head-on, he did state that he
had “serious doubts” about the validity of the “state action” requirement.263 He
questioned why Section 5 would not allow Congress to provide a remedy
against a private actor.264
IV. MORRISON’S IMPACT ON LATER COMMERCE CLAUSE CASES
Justice Breyer’s dissent notwithstanding, the Morrison opinion has
definitely cleared the air with respect to Section 5 and the “state action”
doctrine. Reading the opinion, one might predict that the decision would also
spark a dramatic change in lower courts’ interpretations of the Commerce
Clause. This, however, has not been the case. As shown below, most lower
courts hearing Commerce Clause challenges to federal laws have construed
Morrison in its narrowest sense. Thus, the overwhelming trend is to
distinguish Morrison rather than to apply it to other federal laws.
One way courts have downplayed the impact of Morrison is by ignoring
the fact that the Supreme Court failed to use the “rational basis” test in the case
to determine whether a substantial effect on interstate commerce was present.
Although the Court did not explicitly reject the “rational basis” test, its
conclusion in the case implied that it did. As Justice Souter pointed out in his
dissent, the “mountain” of evidence supporting the VAWA was a much
stronger indicator of a rational basis than was the anecdotal evidence used to
support Title II in Heart of Atlanta and McClung.265 It is more reasonable to
conclude, then, that the Court abandoned the “rational basis” test (or drastically
changed it) rather than to conclude that the “mountain” of evidence did not
meet the “rational basis” standard. Despite this logic, however, many lower
courts have concluded that the “rational basis” test survived Morrison.266

261. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 656-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 660.
263. Id. at 664-66. Justice Breyer stated: “I need not, and do not, answer the § 5
question . . . .” Id. at 666.
264. Id. at 665 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 635 (Souter, J., dissenting).
266. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 490 (4th Cir. 2000) (concluding that Morrison
modified but did not supplant the “rational basis” test); United States v. Angle, 234 F.3d 326, 337
(7th Cir. 2000) (stating that it is bound to apply the “rational basis” test); United States v. Gregg,
226 F.3d 253, 261-62, 263, 267 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying the “rational basis” standard without
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Courts have also misinterpreted the fourth factor of the Lopez-Morrison
test, the “attenuation” factor. Some courts have failed to acknowledge that the
attenuation test must be used in light of the distinction between state and
federal spheres of authority.267 For example, the Fifth Circuit, in Groome
Resources Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson,268 limited its “attenuation” analysis to a
question of whether the causal chain relied on the prohibited “cost of crime” or
“national productivity” arguments.269 The court did not address the broader
question of whether the chain of reasoning would potentially allow the federal
government to infringe upon matters traditionally left to the states.270 Other
courts have construed this fourth factor in a similar fashion.271
Perhaps the most significant uncertainty about the Commerce Clause after
Morrison is the relative weight the courts should give to each of the four
“substantial effects” factors. For example, in United States v. Visnich,272 a
federal district court in Ohio found that Morrison was merely a shift of
emphasis away from the “congressional findings” factor.273 In upholding the
constitutionality of a federal law prohibiting certain people under protective
orders from possessing firearms,274 the Visnich court found the statute’s
jurisdictional element to be sufficient in distinguishing it from the VAWA’s
civil remedy provision.275 The court downplayed the importance of the “nature

reference to Morrison); United States v. Fleischli, 119 F. Supp. 2d 819, 822 (C.D. Ill. 2000)
(declining to read Morrison as a modification of the “rational basis” test).
267. The Court in Morrison criticized the petitioners for using “‘a view of causation that
would obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local . . .’” Morrison, 529
U.S. at 616 n.6 (quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554
(1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring)). Furthermore, it is clear that the state/federal distinction was
critical to the Court’s analysis in Morrison. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (stating that the
activity regulated by § 13981 of the VAWA “has always been the province of the States”).
268. 234 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2000).
269. Id. at 214-15.
270. See generally id.
271. See, e.g., Allied Local & Reg’l Mfrs. Caucus v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 215 F.3d 61,
82 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The court in that case concluded that the link between air pollution and
interstate commerce was not attenuated, but it did not examine whether the scope of the federal
regulation at issue would infringe on matters traditionally of state concern. Id. See also United
States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 119 (2d Cir. 2000) (ignoring the fourth factor altogether).
272. 109 F. Supp. 2d 757 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
273. Id. at 761. The court concluded that Morrison was “neither a change nor a modification
in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but merely a change in emphasis on one of the several factors
the Court considers in evaluating legislation based on Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.” Id.
274. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
275. Visnich, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 761-62. Apparently, members of Congress also concluded
that the lack of a jurisdictional element was the fatal flaw of § 13981. In July 2000, the civil
remedy provision was reintroduced in the House of Representatives with additional language
requiring a link to interstate commerce. H.R. 5021, 106th Cong. (2000).
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of the activity” and the “attenuation” factors and declined to engage in any
discussion of congressional findings.276
The relative importance of the “jurisdictional element” factor is an
especially controversial matter. The favored approach among lower courts is
the Visnich approach,277 to hold that a jurisdictional element alone can save a
statute from the wrath of Morrison.278 One striking exception, however, can be
found in United States v. Faasse.279 In that case, the Sixth Circuit struck down
the Child Support Recovery Act, which makes it a federal crime to fail to pay
child support for a child who lives in another state.280 Although the Faasse
decision was later vacated by the Sixth Circuit,281 it nonetheless is significant
because it was the first case after Morrison to find a statute unconstitutional in
spite of a jurisdictional element.282 The court concluded that this jurisdictional
“hook” was not enough to overcome its conclusion that child support
obligations were not commercial in nature.283 Unlike the Visnich court, the
Faasse court apparently read the Morrison decision to rely almost entirely on
the “economic nature” factor and on the “attenuation” factor, with a special
emphasis on the “infringement into state concerns” element. The Faasse court
stated that it was giving due regard to the Morrison Court’s warning against
overly elastic conceptions of the Commerce Clause that give Congress
authority over areas traditionally reserved for the states.284
In the 2001 case of United States v. Sweet,285 a federal court in Oregon
recognized that the lack of a jurisdictional element was not the sole reason that
the Morrison Court struck down § 13981 of the VAWA.286 Like Visnich, the
Sweet case also considered the constitutionality of a provision of the federal

276. See Visnich, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 761 n.5.
277. The choice of the Visnich case as an example is purely arbitrary, as is the label “Visnich
approach.” There is nothing particularly compelling about the Visnich case that would set it apart
from the other cases that have adopted the same approach. However, for the sake of expediency,
the practice of using a statute’s jurisdictional element to uphold its constitutionality will
hereinafter be referred to as the “Visnich approach.”
278. See, e.g., United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 402 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Wesela, 223 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Malone, 222 F.3d 1286, 1295 (10th
Cir. 2000); United States v. Fleischli, 119 F. Supp. 2d 819, 822 (C.D. Ill. 2000); United States v.
Suggs, No. 3:99CR244 (JBA), 2000 WL 1658591, at *6 (D. Conn. Sept. 7, 2000).
279. 227 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2000).
280. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
281. United States v. Faasse, 234 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2000).
282. The statute’s jurisdictional element is found at § 228(a).
283. Faasse, 227 F.3d at 670. The court stated that holding otherwise would turn the
“Interstate Commerce Clause” into the “Interstate Clause.” Id.
284. Id. at 671-72 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000)).
285. No. CR 00-99-01-PA, 2000 WL 1845779 (D. Or. Sept. 7, 2000).
286. Id. at *5.
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firearms statute.287 In the court’s decision, Judge Panner criticized earlier
Ninth Circuit decisions that found the same statute constitutional merely
because it contained a jurisdictional element.288 Panner suggested that the
circuit court erred by failing to consider the other three Lopez-Morrison
factors.289 He also hinted that the statute exceeded Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority; yet he stated that he was bound to follow Ninth Circuit
precedent, and he ruled the statute constitutional.290
Although the Faasse decision did not stand, the Sweet decision indicates
that the reasoning behind the Faasse opinion has support in other jurisdictions.
Thus, it is still uncertain whether the Visnich approach or the Faasse approach
will eventually prevail. One thing that is certain about the Morrison decision
is that it, like Lopez, has opened the floodgates for constitutional challenges to
Eager litigants have used Morrison to attack the
federal laws.291
constitutionality of everything from anti-racketeering laws292 to federal laws
protecting abortion clinics.293 In light of this, there is little doubt that if a hate
crime bill is passed into law, it will eventually meet the same fate.294
V. THE FEDERAL HATE CRIME BILL
A.

Provisions of the Legislation

The Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act of 2001 would add a new
section 145 to title 18 of the United States Code.295 This new section would be
divided into two parts. Section (a)(1) would forbid “willfully caus[ing] bodily
injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a firearm, or an explosive or
incendiary device, attempt[ing] to cause bodily injury to any person, because
of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin of any
person.”296 Section (a)(2) would criminalize the same acts when based on
287. At issue in Sweet was the section banning convicted felons from carrying firearms. See
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994).
288. Sweet, 2000 WL 1845779, at *5.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. The Lopez decision sparked a flood of cases attacking the constitutionality of federal
statutes. For a discussion of the proliferation of Commerce Clause challenges in the wake of
Lopez, see Antony Barone Kolenc, Note, Commerce Clause Challenges After United States v.
Lopez, 50 FLA. L. REV. 867 (1998).
292. See United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 119 (2d Cir. 2000).
293. See Norton v. Reno, No. 4:00-CV-141, 2000 WL 1769580 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 24, 2000).
294. See, e.g., Traditional Values Coalition, Hate Crimes Update: The Kennedy Amendment
Details, available at http://www.traditionalvalues.org/hc_ken.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2001)
(predicting that “the questionable constitutionality of Kennedy’s hate crime legislation . . . would
undoubtedly be the subject of judicial challenge”).
295. S. 19, 107th Cong. § 107(a) (2001).
296. Section (a)(1) would read as follows:
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religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation or disability.297 While
(a)(1) does not require the government to show any connection to interstate
(1) OFFENSES INVOLVING ACTUAL OR PERCEIVED RACE, COLOR, RELIGION,
OR NATIONAL ORIGIN- Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, willfully
causes bodily injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a firearm, or an explosive or
incendiary device, attempts to cause bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or
perceived race, color, religion, or national origin of any person—
(A) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined in accordance with this title, or
both; and
(B) shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, fined in accordance with this
title, or both, if—
(i) death results from the offense; or
(ii) the offense includes kidnaping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual
abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill.
Id.
297. Section (a)(2) would read as follows:
(2) OFFENSES INVOLVING ACTUAL OR PERCEIVED RELIGION, NATIONAL
ORIGIN, GENDER, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, OR DISABILITY(A) IN GENERAL- Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, in any
circumstance described in subparagraph (B), willfully causes bodily injury to any person
or, through the use of fire, a firearm, or an explosive or incendiary device, attempts to
cause bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or perceived religion, national
origin, gender, sexual orientation, or disability of any person—
(i) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined in accordance with this title,
or both; and
(ii) shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, fined in accordance with
this title, or both, if—
(I) death results from the offense; or
(II) the offense includes kidnaping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual
abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill.
(B) CIRCUMSTANCES DESCRIBED- For purposes of subparagraph (A), the
circumstances described in this subparagraph are that—
(i) the conduct described in subparagraph (A) occurs during the course of, or as
the result of, the travel of the defendant or the victim—
(I) across a State line or national border; or
(II) using a channel, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign
commerce;
(ii) the defendant uses a channel, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign
commerce in connection with the conduct described in subparagraph (A);
(iii) in connection with the conduct described in subparagraph (A): the defendant
employs a firearm, explosive or incendiary device, or other weapon that has
traveled in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iv) the conduct described in subparagraph (A)—
(I) interferes with commercial or other economic activity in which the victim
is engaged at the time of the conduct; or
(II) otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce.
Id. Note that religion and national origin are mentioned in both sections. This is due to the doubt
concerning the Thirteenth Amendment’s applicability to these types of discrimination. See Sara
Sue Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal
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commerce, (a)(2) requires a showing that the defendant used a channel or an
instrumentality of interstate commerce or that the defendant engaged in an
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.298 Neither section
provides a cause of action against a state or state actor.
Included in the language of the act are several congressional findings that
attempt to justify the legislation on Commerce Clause grounds.299 Among
these are: that the problem of hate crime is sufficiently interstate in nature;300
that perpetrators cross state lines to commit these crimes;301 that perpetrators
use instruments that have traveled in interstate commerce to commit these
crimes;302 and that such crimes affect interstate commerce by preventing
members of targeted groups from traveling across state lines and from
purchasing goods and services in the interstate market.303 The findings also
claim federal jurisdiction under the Thirteenth Amendment.304 They claim that
“eliminating racially motivated violence is an important means of eliminating,
to the extent possible, the badges, incidents, and relics of slavery and
involuntary servitude.”305
Due to the differences between sections (a)(1) and (a)(2) in the proposed
bill, each one would merit a unique constitutional analysis. Therefore, the
following discussion looks at sections (a)(1) and (a)(2) separately. This
Comment examines whether (a)(1) or (a)(2) can be supported under the
Commerce Clause or under the Thirteenth Amendment as the findings claim.
Furthermore, it shows why the Fourteenth Amendment would not apply.
B.

Constitutionality of the Legislation
1.

Section (a)(1)

As discussed above, the Lopez-Morrison test divides Congress’s
Commerce Clause power into three categories: authority to regulate the
channels of interstate commerce, authority to regulate instruments or things in
interstate commerce, and authority to regulate activities that have a substantial

Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1235 n.27 (2000). The bill’s drafters contend that religion
and national origin should be considered “races” for purposes of the Thirteenth Amendment. S.
19, 107th Cong. § 102(11) (2001).
298. S. 19, 107th Cong. § 107(a) (2001).
299. Id. § 102.
300. Id. § 102(1).
301. Id. § 102(7).
302. Id. § 102(9).
303. S. 19, 107th Cong. § 102(6) (2001).
304. Id. § 102(10).
305. Id.
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effect on interstate commerce.306 For (a)(1) to be constitutional under the
Commerce Clause, it must fit into one of these three categories.
First, it will likely be uncontested that the legislation does not fall under
the first category. Courts have defined the channels of interstate commerce as
“‘navigable rivers, lakes, and canals of the United States; the interstate railroad
track system; . . . interstate telephone and telegraph lines; air traffic routes;
television and radio broadcast frequencies.’”307 To fall under this category, the
law must regulate these channels directly rather than regulate an activity that
merely “implicates” or “invokes” the use of these channels.308 Clearly, the
hate crime bill speaks to none of these channels directly.
Likewise, the act does not regulate a thing or instrument in interstate
commerce. Under this category, the mere character of the activities sought to
be regulated makes them the subject of federal regulation.309 Vehicles used to
transport goods across state lines fall within this category,310 as does money
deposited in a federally insured bank.311 An “instrumentality” can also be an
intangible item, such as a debt.312 Although Congress has found that
instrumentalities of interstate commerce are used in hate crimes,313 (a)(1)
regulates the behavior, not the instruments themselves. Interpersonal human
behavior is clearly distinguishable from commercial objects or debts. Thus,
the act cannot draw its authority under the second Lopez-Morrison category
and must pass the four-factor “substantial effects” test if it is to be
constitutional.
Clearly the first factor, the nature of the activity regulated, will be
troublesome for (a)(1). The activity sought to be regulated, causing or
threatening bodily injury, does not appear to be any more economic in nature
than rape or carrying a gun near a school. Courts have been liberal in
classifying an activity as “economic” by including those activities that are not
economic in themselves, but which are part of a larger federal scheme to
regulate interstate commerce.314 But it is still unlikely that this expansive
definition of “economic activity” will encompass the activity regulated in
(a)(1). The purpose behind the legislation is not economic; it is to protect the
safety of citizens.

306. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S 549, 558-59 (1995).
307. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 490-91 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Miles,
122 F.3d 235, 245 (5th Cir. 1997)).
308. United States v. Faasse, 227 F.3d 660, 668 (6th Cir. 2000).
309. United States v. Owens, 159 F.3d 221, 226 (6th Cir. 1998).
310. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 588 (3d Cir. 1995).
311. See Owens, 159 F.3d at 226.
312. See United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 1996).
313. S. 19, 107th Cong. § 102(8) (2001).
314. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 600 (1995).
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The second factor, the jurisdictional element, is absent in this section. The
third factor, congressional findings, is present, but as the Court concluded in
Morrison, this alone will not be enough to demonstrate a statute’s
constitutionality. In any case, the findings supporting this legislation are
nowhere near as voluminous as those supporting the VAWA.
The fourth factor, the attenuation of the link, also weighs heavily against
this section’s constitutionality. This is especially true if a court adopts the
proper reading of Morrison and considers the statute’s potential infringement
into areas of traditional state concern. Indeed, the Court stated in Morrison
that it could think of “no better example” of a power reserved for the states
“than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.”315 The
hate crime bill goes even further than § 13981 in seeking to suppress violent
crime because it is a criminal rather than a civil statute.
By comparing (a)(1) with the unconstitutional § 13981, a court would
discover that (a)(1) has an equally weak showing of the first two factors, and
an equal or lesser showing under the third and fourth factors. The only logical
conclusion to draw from this analysis is that (a)(1), like § 13981, cannot be
supported under the Commerce Clause.
Section (a)(1) also cannot be valid under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Despite the fact that (a)(1) seeks to protect discrimination
against so-called “suspect” classes, Morrison made it clear that congressional
action under Section 5 must be aimed at a state or state actor. Proponents of
the legislation may try to argue that (a)(1) is aimed at the states in that it acts as
a remedy for people who are not being protected under state law. This
argument, however, is unlikely to succeed. The Supreme Court has previously
stated that Congress’s power under the Fourteenth Amendment does not reach
a state’s failure to act.316 Furthermore, the hate crime bill is not limited to
those states in which hate crimes are not being prosecuted. The Morrison
decision indicated that one of the flaws of § 13981 was that it applied to all
states, even those that were effective in handling gender-motivated violence.317
The hate crime bill would face an even steeper battle on this front, since there
is little evidence showing that states have been lax in prosecuting hate
crimes.318

315. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000).
316. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Soc. Servs. Dept., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)
(stating that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is “to protect the people from the State,
not to ensure that the State [protects] them from each other”).
317. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626-27.
318. Senator Orrin Hatch argued this point in the Senate hate crimes debates in June 2000.
146 CONG. REC. S5426 (daily ed. June 20, 2000). Senator Hatch sponsored a bill that would have
required a comprehensive analysis to determine whether states were failing or refusing to
prosecute hate crimes to the full extent of the law. S. 1406, 106th Cong. (1999); 146 CONG. REC.
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The Thirteenth Amendment is the only constitutional provision on which
(a)(1) could arguably be based.319 By finding (a)(1) constitutional under the
Thirteenth Amendment, a court would avoid the “state action” roadblock that
hinders federal action under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court
unambiguously held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.320 that the Thirteenth
Amendment reaches private actors.321 As noted above, one court has even
ruled, albeit over a century ago, that the Amendment allows Congress to
prosecute people who commit crimes based on racial bias.322 A court, then,
could reasonably conclude that (a)(1) is an appropriate congressional means to
eliminate the “badges and incidents of slavery.”
It is not certain, however, that (a)(1) would survive under a Thirteenth
Amendment analysis. At least three problems arise. First, although courts
have recognized that the Amendment addresses discrimination against blacks,
it is still unclear whether the Amendment can also be used to eliminate the
wide categories of discrimination listed in (a)(1). Although the Supreme Court
has implied that the Amendment reaches other forms of racial discrimination
and may also reach discrimination based on religion, the Court has never come
to a clear conclusion on these matters.323 Thus, there is room for
interpretation, and it cannot be said that a court must find that the Thirteenth
Amendment allows Congress to protect all groups listed in (a)(1).
A second problem is one recognized by Professor Baker of Louisiana State
University.324 He argued that even if a court found the hate crime bill
constitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment, the bill would still be suspect
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because of its racebased classifications.325 He concluded that the Supreme Court would be
unwilling to approve a bill that puts two constitutional amendments in
conflict.326
Finally, although it may be reasonable for a court to find (a)(1)
constitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment, it is not the necessary
conclusion. A court could conceivably distinguish the hate crime law from the
statute upheld in Jones by recognizing that the former is a criminal statute
while the latter provides a civil remedy. Also, a court seeking to reject the

S5425. The Senate approved his amendment on the same day it approved Senator Kennedy’s
proposal. 146 CONG. REC. S5425-28.
319. See Baker, supra note 9, at 1220.
320. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
321. Id. at 439.
322. See United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707 (C.C.D. La. 1874) and supra text
accompanying notes -.
323. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
324. Baker, supra note 9, at 1220-21.
325. Id. at 1220.
326. Id. at 1221.
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Thirteenth Amendment basis could look to the Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Cruikshank,327 which declined to confirm the lower court’s
conclusion that the Amendment reaches criminal prosecutions of race-based
violence.328 Although these arguments may not be overly convincing, they
show that it is at least possible for a court to find (a)(1) to be beyond
Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment authority.
Given that a court can reasonably take either path with respect to (a)(1)’s
validity under the Thirteenth Amendment, it seems highly unlikely that a
ruling of constitutionality would survive an appeal to the current Supreme
Court. The trend among recent Supreme Court decisions clearly has been in
favor of state autonomy at the expense of federal power.329 Thus, given two
options, the Court would be inclined to choose the one that limits federal
authority. It is hard to imagine the current Supreme Court opening the doors
for a new avenue of federal power, especially one that could have far-reaching
effects.
Thus, section (a)(1), in its current form, cannot be justified under the
Commerce Clause due to its lack of a jurisdictional element and due to the fact
that it is a criminal statute that does not seek to regulate an economic activity.
The section also cannot be justified under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, since it is not directed at a state or state actor. Finally, section
(a)(1) might be justifiable under the Thirteenth Amendment, at least with
respect to certain forms of discrimination, but it is unlikely that the Supreme
Court will look with favor on such an interpretation.
2.

Section (a)(2)

Section (a)(2) differs from (a)(1) in two respects. First, (a)(2) protects
against three forms of discrimination—discrimination based on sexual
orientation, gender and age—which have neither been classified by the courts
as “suspect classifications” nor been suggested by the courts to fall under the
purview of the Thirteenth Amendment.330 Second, this subsection contains a
jurisdictional element, limiting its application to matters involving interstate

327. 92 U.S. 542 (1875)
328. Id. at 553.
329. See. e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (holding that states are
immune from federal lawsuits filed under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (forbidding the federal government from requiring state
law enforcement officers to enforce federal handgun regulations).
330. Case law indicates that the Thirteenth Amendment could cover discrimination against
national origin and religion, both covered in (a)(2). See supra note 154 (discussing Shaare Tefila
Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987)). If this view prevails, a Thirteenth Amendment
analysis with respect to these classes would be identical to the analysis under (a)(1). This
Comment’s remaining (a)(2) analysis, therefore, is limited to those types of discrimination
beyond the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment.
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commerce. It is clear that the drafters of the bill intended (a)(2) to fall
exclusively under Congress’s Commerce Clause power.
Because (a)(2) is identical to (a)(1) in all other respects, it is unnecessary
to replay the analysis under the first two categories of the Lopez-Morrison test.
It is apparent that (a)(2), like (a)(1), cannot be justified under either the
“channels” or “instrumentalities” categories. The jurisdictional element in
(a)(2), however, would significantly change the “substantial effects” analysis.
The question, then, is whether this jurisdictional element would be enough to
uphold (a)(2) as constitutional.
It seems a court could take one of two paths on this issue. It could either
follow the Visnich approach, which emphasized the importance of the
jurisdictional element factor,331 or it could follow the Sixth Circuit’s
interpretation in Faasse, which held that a jurisdictional element is not enough
in the face of a strong showing of non-economic nature and an infringement
into state matters.332 It is unclear at this point which path is more consistent
with current Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Reasonable arguments can be
made on both sides.
In support of the Faasse approach, one could argue the point made by
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Morrison, that the Supreme Court has never used
aggregation under the “substantial effects” test to uphold a law that was not
economic in nature.333 In contrast, the Court has repeatedly upheld laws that
lacked either a jurisdictional element or express congressional findings. If one
assumes that Heart of Atlanta and McClung are still good law, then one could
reasonably conclude that the economic nature of the activity is the key factor.
The statute at issue in those cases had neither a jurisdictional element nor
support from formal congressional findings, yet both regulated economic
activity, and thus both were constitutional.334
Another argument in support of the Faasse approach is the language used
by the Court in Morrison. The contrast between the discussion of the
economic nature and the discussion of the jurisdictional element is striking.
Although § 13981 was lacking in both elements, the Court emphasized that the
non-economic nature of the regulated activity was “central” to the Court’s
analysis.335 The Court went out of its way to emphasize that “thus far in our
Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of

331. United States v. Visnich, 109 F. Supp. 2d 757 (N.D. Ohio 2000). For an explanation of
the term “Visnich approach,” see supra note 277.
332. United States v. Faasse, 227 F.3d 660, 670 (6th Cir. 2000).
333. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000).
334. See also Groome Res. Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 211 (5th Cir. 2000)
(finding the Fair Housing Amendments Act constitutional under the Commerce Clause because
even though the statute lacks a jurisdictional element, it regulates an economic activity).
335. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610.
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intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.”336 On the
other hand, the best the Court could say about the jurisdictional element is that
it “may” establish constitutionality, or that it would “lend support” to such a
position.337
If a court follows the Faasse conclusion that the jurisdictional element
factor is only a minor one, it would not be surprising if the court found (a)(2)
unconstitutional in spite of its jurisdictional element. As shown above in the
discussion of (a)(1), the minor factors of a jurisdictional element and
congressional findings would be far outweighed by a particularly weak
showing of the two major factors: the nature of the activity regulated and the
attenuation of the link to interstate commerce.
It is not altogether clear, though, that the Faasse approach is the proper
one. For one, as mentioned above, the Faasse decision was vacated.338
Furthermore, it had expressed a minority position with respect to the
constitutionality of the Child Support Recovery Act. In Faasse, the Sixth
Circuit departed from the decisions of the Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits,
which found the same statute to be valid under the Commerce Clause.339
Opponents of the Faasse approach can also find support in the language of
the Morrison decision. While the Court did recognize that it never upheld a
regulation of intrastate non-economic activity under the Commerce Clause, the
Court also stated, in the same sentence, that “we need not adopt a categorical
rule against aggregating the effects of any non economic activity in order to
decide these cases . . . .”340 This indicates that the Court was unwilling to do
away with the “minor” Lopez factors and to let the “economic nature” factor
bear the entire burden.
Another argument against applying the Faasse approach is that the
jurisdictional element found to be insufficient in that case is significantly
different than the one found in (a)(2). The Child Support Recovery Act’s
jurisdictional element only requires that the parent live in a different state from
the child. As the Faasse court pointed out, the Act has the “interstate” part but
is lacking the “commerce” part.341 In contrast, (a)(2) requires that either the
defendant or victim have traveled in interstate or foreign commerce, have used
a facility or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce, or have engaged
in any activity otherwise affecting interstate or foreign commerce.342 This
jurisdictional element is strikingly similar to the one found in the federal
336. Id. at 613.
337. Id. at 612, 613.
338. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
339. See United States v. Parker, 108 F.3d 28 (3rd Cir. 1997); United States v. Bailey, 115
F.3d 1222 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996).
340. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
341. United States v. Faasse, 227 F.3d 660, 670 (6th Cir. 2000).
342. S. 19, 107th Cong. § 107(a) (2001).
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firearms statute, which the Supreme Court, in Lopez, used as an example of a
valid jurisdictional element.343 Furthermore, the Faasse court even
acknowledged that if the jurisdictional element of the Child Support Recovery
Act had been more limiting, it might have withstood constitutional scrutiny.344
Therefore, it is possible that (a)(2)’s jurisdictional element would be
enough to uphold it under the Commerce Clause. But even if a court found it
facially constitutional, the question remains as to what sort of jurisdictional
“hook” would need to be shown to pass constitutional muster. Taking the
Matthew Shepard case as an example, would it have been enough if the
prosecution could prove that the kidnappers drove Shepard in a car that had
traveled in interstate commerce, or that they had used an interstate highway, or
that they had used the telephone to plan the attack?
The case law is unclear on where to draw the line, if a line does indeed
exist, between constitutional jurisdictional elements and unconstitutional ones.
The prevailing view is that when a jurisdictional element invokes the full
power under the Commerce Clause, a party need only show a “de minimis”
connection with interstate commerce.345 For example, in order to convict
under the federal firearms statute, a prosecutor only needs to show that the
defendant’s gun traveled in interstate commerce at some point in time.346
Lower courts, however, have had difficulty determining when this “de
minimis” test has been satisfied, especially when the prosecution must show a
“de minimis” effect on interstate commerce. Two cases involving the federal
Hobbs Act illustrate this point.347 In United States v. Bailey,348 the Seventh
Circuit found that an attempted robbery of a cocaine dealer satisfied the act’s
jurisdictional element.349 The court reasoned that the money the defendant
attempted to rob would have been used by the dealer to purchase cocaine,
which is an article of interstate commerce.350 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit, in
United States v. Wang,351 found the nexus was not established in the robbery of
a restaurant owner, even though the money taken was intended by the
restaurateur to be used to purchase goods in interstate commerce. 352

343. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995).
344. Faasse, 227 F.3d at 670.
345. See, e.g., United States v. Rea, 223 F.3d 741, 743 (8th Cir. 2000).
346. Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575 (1977).
347. The Hobbs Act prohibits any robbery or extortion that “in any way or degree obstructs,
delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce.” 18
U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1994).
348. 227 F.3d 792 (5th Cir. 1997).
349. Id. at 798.
350. Id.
351. 222 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2000).
352. Id.
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This confusion also has arisen in cases involving the federal arson statute.
The Ninth Circuit held that the fact that a torched house had once received gas
from interstate commerce was not sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional
element of the statute.353 In United States v. Jones,354 the Seventh Circuit
disagreed with its sister court on this particular issue.355 The Supreme Court
had the chance to settle the dispute when it granted certiorari to the Jones
case.356 However, the Court sidestepped the constitutional question by finding
that the jurisdictional element in the federal arson statute is limited to buildings
that are “used” in interstate commerce, not ones that “affect” interstate
commerce, which, the Court said, would have invoked the full extent of
Commerce Clause authority.357 Because (a)(2)’s jurisdictional element extends
to activities that “affect” interstate commerce, it does invoke the full power of
the Commerce Clause, and thus Jones would be of no help in drawing the line.
Jones was decided one week after Morrison. This would seem to suggest
that the Court was sending out the message that its Lopez-Morrison
“substantial effects” standard would apply only to facial challenges to federal
laws, and not to determinations of jurisdictional elements. The Ninth Circuit
apparently adopted this interpretation. It stated that it was “not prepared to say
the teachings of Morrison apply to statutes . . . that do contain a precise
statement of a jurisdictional element.”358 Other circuits have adopted this
approach as well.359 These courts seem to conclude that two different tests
should be used: a broad one when determining whether a jurisdictional element
is satisfied, and a more narrow one when determining whether a Commerce
Clause regulation is constitutional on its face.
The Sixth Circuit, however, seems to have shied away from this
interpretation. In the Wang case, the court, when looking for a “substantial
effect” under a jurisdictional nexus, gave regard to the Lopez Court’s
admonition against piling “inference upon inference” in order to find an effect
on commerce.360 On the other hand, the Wang court did make it clear that “the
de minimis standard . . . survived Lopez.”361 The Sixth Circuit even reemphasized this point in United States v. Carmichael,362 decided after
353. United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 528 (9th Cir. 1995); Cf. United States v.
Denalli, 73 F.3d 328, 330 (11th Cir. 1996) (also finding an insufficient link between a residential
house and interstate commerce).
354. 178 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 1999).
355. Id. at 480.
356. Jones v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1904 (2000).
357. Id. at 1911.
358. United States v. Jones, 231 F.3d 508, 514-15 (9th Cir. 2000).
359. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 236 F.3d 848, 852 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Malone, 222 F.3d 1286, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 2000).
360. United States v. Wang, 222 F.3d 234, 239 (6th Cir. 2000).
361. Id. at 238.
362. 232 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2000).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

IS HATE A FORM OF COMMERCE?

1015

Morrison, when it stated that “even a very minimal connection to interstate
commerce is sufficient” to satisfy a jurisdictional element.363 A more recent
Sixth Circuit case, however, seems to have departed from the Carmichael
approach. In United States v. Corp,364 the court recognized that “Morrison and
Lopez have required that the jurisdictional components of constitutional
statutes are to be read as meaningful restrictions.”365 The defendant in Corp
was charged with producing and possessing pornographic photographs of a
minor in violation of federal law.366 The court concluded that the defendant’s
use of photographic paper that was manufactured out-of-state was not enough
to bring him under federal jurisdiction.367 Although the Corp court declined to
find the child pornography statute facially unconstitutional, the court did find
that the statute’s jurisdictional element was unconstitutionally broad when
applied to the defendant.368 It is important to note that unlike the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Jones, the Sixth Circuit in Corp did not frame its argument
as a matter of statutory construction but rather found constitutional defects in
the statute as written. While the Corp decision did not go so far as to eliminate
the “de minimis” test altogether, the Sixth Circuit at least has given more
regard to Lopez and Morrison than has its sister courts.
The Sixth Circuit has started down the correct path, but it has not gone far
enough. Common sense dictates that the “de minimis” test be put to rest
entirely. Lopez and Morrison have clearly shown that Congress must show
more than a “de minimis” link to interstate commerce to support a statute on its
face. It is only logical, then, that a party must also show more than a “de
minimis” link in order to satisfy a jurisdictional element. To reason otherwise
would lead to bizarre conclusions. For example, say that the VAWA did
contain a jurisdictional element that required the plaintiff to show that a sexual
assault “affected” interstate commerce. This would force the plaintiff to
recycle the same arguments that Congress made in its findings: that the crime
discouraged the plaintiff from traveling in interstate commerce, reduced her
employment opportunities, increased her health expenditures, and reduced her
consumer spending. This would seem to be enough to satisfy many circuits’
idea of a “de minimis” test, although it is clearly not enough to satisfy the
“substantial effects” test under Morrison. Thus, failing to equate the two tests
would allow an end-run around Morrison, by allowing plaintiffs (or
prosecutors) to use the same attenuated links to interstate commerce that
Congress is now prohibited to use.

363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

Id. at 516.
236 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 332 (emphasis added).
Id. at 326-27.
Id. at 326, 333.
Id. at 332-33.
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Therefore, while it is possible that (a)(2) may be facially constitutional
thanks to its jurisdictional element, a court, in order to be consistent with Lopez
and Morrison, would have to require a prosecutor to show a stronger link to
interstate commerce than what has traditionally been accepted. Stacking
“inference upon inference” is no longer an option. Thus, proving the
jurisdictional element of a hate crime would not be the mere formality the
bill’s proponents expect it to be. Instead, it could be a significant hindrance
and could render (a)(2) a criminal statute without teeth.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act of 2001
will run into constitutional problems under the Commerce Clause and under
the Fourteenth and Thirteenth Amendments. The Morrison decision shows
that (a)(1) cannot be justified under the Commerce Clause due to its noneconomic nature and lack of a jurisdictional element. Precedent could lead a
court to uphold (a)(1) under the Thirteenth Amendment. However, it is
unlikely that the Supreme Court would adopt such an interpretation.
Furthermore, while (a)(2) may arguably be constitutional under the Commerce
Clause, Morrison requires that prosecutors show a strong connection to
interstate commerce rather than just a vague relation. Finally, Morrison shows
that neither (a)(1) nor (a)(2) can be justified under the Fourteenth Amendment
since neither addresses state actions.
Morrison further shows that the obvious trend in the Supreme Court is to
limit federal power. Perhaps Morrison’s greatest significance is that it proved
that Lopez was not an anomaly but rather was a shift in paradigm.369 Though it
seems unlikely that this current trend will create a complete reversal of almost
a century of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court so far has been more
than willing to extend its new Commerce Clause attack on recently adopted
laws. Federal laws like drug laws have gained general acceptance, and
upsetting them would cause a dramatic shake-up of a massive federal
bureaucracy. Contrast this with the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the
VAWA’s civil remedy provision, which the Court quickly killed before they
could become part of the national culture. Therefore, absent a change in the
population of the Supreme Court, an infant hate crime statute would not stand
a chance.
Hate crimes are indeed a prevalent problem in the United States, and
Senator Kennedy and civil rights activists should be commended for at least
addressing the problem. Federalizing all hate crimes, however, is not the
369. See, e.g., Norton v. Reno, No. 4:00-CV-141, 2000 WL 1769580, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Nov.
24, 2000) (recognizing that “[i]n Morrison, the court made clear that its decision in United States
v. Lopez . . . was not an isolated, confined case but rather one with potentially substantial impact
on all Commerce Clause analyses”).
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answer. The hate crime bill pending in the Senate would extend the long arm
of federal jurisdiction into areas never before imagined. Its broad “threat of
force” language could make a squabble between a husband and wife or a
schoolyard fistfight matters for the FBI. The legislation would not only blur
the line between state and federal jurisdiction; it would erase it entirely.
For more than two centuries, fighting local crime has been a matter for
local authorities, officials who have a legitimate stake in whether perpetrators
are brought to justice. Federal agents have no such motivation.370 This is why
the Founding Fathers wisely chose to limit federal authority to specific
enumerated powers. It is unfortunate that Congress, and often the courts,
forget this fact.
DAN HASENSTAB*

370. See also Baker, supra note 9, at 1215 (arguing that many federal crimes go unprosecuted
due, in part, to the heavy backlog on federal court dockets).
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